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Attorney General v. NOS, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 11, 84 P.3d 1052
(Nev. 2004)1
PROCEDURE FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS—STANDARD
FOR OBTAINING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN A
STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Summary
Appeal from the First Judicial District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction
brought by Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) against a
telecommunications provider for allegedly engaging in deceptive trade practices due to
procedural deficiencies in the pleadings supporting the motion.
Disposition
Affirmed on different grounds. The BCP did not have any factual support for the
preliminary injunction in the record. BCP’s motion was defective because they failed to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the statutory conditions authorizing injunctive
relief exist. However, BCP could amend its pleadings and filing a new motion for
injunctive relief. BCP was not required to show irreparable injury or inadequate legal
remedy to obtain injunctive relief.
Factual and Procedural History
Based on numerous customer complaints filed against telecommunications
providers NOS Communications Inc. and Affinity Networks Inc. (collectively, NOS) the
BCP determined that NOS was engaging in deceptive trade practices in violation of NRS
598.0963(3).2 However, before the BCP could file an enforcement action pursuant to
NRS 589.0963, NOS filed a preemptive complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against the BCP. NOS sought a declaration that it was not engaging in
deceptive trade practices.
After filing an answer, but before filing its own claim or a counterclaim, the BCP
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to NRS 589.0693 for allegedly
engaging in deceptive trade practices. Judge Michael R. Griffin of the First Judicial
District Court denied BCP’s preliminary injunction motion holding that a preexisting
Nevada Public Utility Commission rulemaking workshop was an adequate remedy at law.
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By Christopher W. Carson
NRS 598.0963(3) (2004) provides that:
[W]hen the attorney general has reason to believe that a person has engaged in
or is engaging in a deceptive trade practice, the attorney general may bring an
action in the name of the State of Nevada against that person to obtain a
temporary restraining order, a preliminary or permanent injunction, or other
appropriate relief.

Discussion
Upon appeal the Nevada Supreme Court first recognized that the district court has
discretion in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction.3 The court also cited
case law that supports a reversal of a denial of a preliminary injunction only where the
district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or
on clearly erroneous findings of fact.4
The court held that the district court was correct in not issuing the preliminary
injunction, but did so not based on the district court’s holding but rather procedural
deficiencies in the BCP’s motion.5 Under Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres,6 the court could
have upheld the district court’s ruling, even if it reached the wrong grounds, so long as it
reached correct result. However, the court went further to address the merits of the
district court’s ruling to clarify the jurisprudence in this area.
The court agreed with BCP’s argument that Nevada Real Estate Commission v.
7
Ressel supports the presumption of irreparable injury in a statutory enforcement action.
NOS argued that the traditional standard of requiring a showing of irreparable injury
before issuing injunctive relief was the proper remedy.
In Ressel, the court held that proof of irreparable harm was not needed since the
state’s policy was declared by statute. By allowing a government agency to seek
injunctive relief, the sole conditions for the issuance of such an injunction are those set
out in the act itself.8
The court went on to support its holding by looking to other jurisdictions that do
not require a showing of irreparable harm in statutory enforcement actions before a
preliminary junction will issue.9 For example, in Ackerman v. Tri-City Geriatric &
Health Care10 the court concluded that a statutory action granting a government agent the
right to sue for injunctive relief is wholly different than equitable action for injunctive
relief.11
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Nevada Escrow Service, Inc. v. Crockett, 91 Nev. 201, 202-03 (1975).
U.S. v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Because the BCP did not assert a affirmative claim for injunctive relief in its answer or through a
counterclaim and attached no affidavits containing admissible statements or admissible documents to the
motion the motion for preliminary injunction was procedurally defective.
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97 Nev. 399, 403 (1981).
7
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See U.S. v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (noting the difference between the
standard needed for granting an injunction when a governmental entity is involved as opposed to two
private litigants) see also Vill. Of Riverdale v. Allied Waste Transp., 334 Ill.App.3d 224, 267 (2002)
(presuming harm to the public at large from statutory violation enough to support granting of injunction).
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55 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 1978)
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Id. at 148-49.
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The court held that the district court went too far in holding that the utility commission
workshop was an adequate remedy at law. The court held that once the governmental
agency makes a showing of admissible evidence of a statutory violation (here a deceptive
trade practice) the injunction should issue. Because the BCP failed to adequately support
its motion for the preliminary injunction the district court was correct in denying it.
Conclusion
While the outcome in this case remains the same, the court essentially grants for
the appellants in this matter. By establishing that irreparable harm is presumed when a
preliminary injunction occurs in a statutory enforcement action, the court practically
invites the BCP to amend its motion and file a new injunction. As long as the BCP can
present any admissible evidence showing a deceptive trade practice the injunction will
automatically issue and preclude NOS from engaging in the alleged deceptive trade
practices.

